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Problem field 
When the 2008 crisis showed the hollowness of the financial market, it began as a subprime crisis 
in the United States, but the global interconnectedness of the world economy turned it into a global 
economic recession crisis of both the financial and non-financial sectors of the economy. It did not 
take long for it to develop into a debt crisis in Europe, creating the first major crisis in the Eurozone 
established under 10 years earlier (Mylonas, 2012:646). In the West it is not only a economic crisis, 
but even more a crisis in a specific way of living. The 2000s was all about growth. And then all of 
sudden it stopped. Questions need to be raised about the sustainability of this growth, and whether 
or not it mostly consisted of a consumer-based debt-fueled growth. With the need to both keep 
wages low, in order to generate surpluses, and to keep consumption high, in order to generate 
growth, lending became the central vehicle of market economy. This allowed people and states to 
spend more than their income allowed (Mylonas, 2012:648). Douzinas states that late capitalism 
works through consumption and rent, where people and states has to borrow to spend; “debt and 
indebtedness have become integral to life from birth to death” (Douzinas, 2011:26). When debt in 
this sense becomes whats normal, then you can expect people, companies and states to obtain debt, 
to create growth. And growth is the foundation of the market-based economy. But debt is a 
complicated concept, and it can only function if it is followed by a commitment to pay it back. I will 
argue though, and Douzinas backs me up, that this sense of morality in which debt evokes feelings 
of moral failure and guilt for the debtor is almost exclusively identified with a Northern Protestant 
work and cultural ethic of sin, guilt and punishment. (Douzinas, 2011:28) This creates a dilemma; all 
people, companies and states are part of a system in which you need to obtain debt in order to 
generate wealth. But not all people, companies and states are part of a culture in which debt is 
connected with moral failure and guilt. ' 
A country that has become the epicenter of the European crisis is Greece with a serious debt 
problem. Faustus states five sources for the Greek debt; “financing of the public sector via internal 
and external borrowing for re-election purposes and for keeping the radical democratic left outside 
the corridors of rel power; the exorbitant defense spending by the two ruling parties of PASOK and 
ND that serves purely NATO-land interests; the parasitic and unproductive functioning of the 
comprador-cum-financial oligarchy; a class that rose to prominence after the mid-1990s, also thats 
to the ´modernizing´ policies of Simitis´s and Papandreou´s cabinets; the country´s entry into the 
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eurozone, which completely put Greece´s economy into a highly disadvantageous position with 
respect to the robust economies and export-led business of the core [Eurozone countries]” (Fauskas, 
2012:35). If these are the sources of the debt, then what are reasons for Greece being of the nerve 
of breakdown as a consequence of its debt. Is the reasons to be found in the market-based system, 
or is it to be found in Greece itself. Economically Greece can be said to be a relatively insignificant 
country, with a contribution to the European GDP, according to Eurostat (2010) of 2,5% between 
2001 and 2010 (Ioakimidis, 2009:652). Both the media and the European is making Greece into a 
“special case” that is “self-responsible” for its crisis and the rest of Europe is in the risk of being 
“contaminated” by Greece´s economic crisis (Mylonas, 2012:650). If the reasons for the crisis in 
Greece is to be found in Greece itself, and if Greece is a relatively insignificant economic player in 
Europe, then this makes one worry about the fragility of the economic system as a whole. If the 
reasons for the crisis is to found in the economic system, then the attention Greece is getting makes 
one suspicion. But instead of looking for reasons that put the blame on either Greece or the 
economic system, I will seek an explanation in a combination; can the reason for crisis be found as 
a consequence of the Greece that has developed inside the EU system. When Greece entered the 
European Community in 1981 it was the most significant external event in the history of Greece. In 
order to understand the current crisis in Greece, I believe this event can be described, in the 
vocabulary of Historical Institutionalism, as a so-called critical juncture, creating path dependencies 
in Greece in relation to the entrance that would not otherwise have existed. The focus will be on 
clientelism as an institution, and the analysis will be centered around how the policies implemented 
in Greece in the 1980 affected, and was affected by, institutionalized clientelism. My hypothesis is 
that the Greece in crisis, is a Greece that has been created through its interaction with the EC, and 
that the existing clientelism in Greece at the time of entering has not changed after the accession, 
but can be seen as an important factor in wanting to understand the current situation.  
 
Research question: 
What is the importance of EU's Regional Policies in the 1980s, in order to understand the current 
economic situation in Greece? 
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Methodology 
Why this project is important 
2013 is the fifth year of an economic crisis in Greece caused by a global crisis. Five years, and no 
Greek person know what to expect from the future. Will life be as they have grown accustomed to, 
a middle class lifestyle with both welfare state-securities and consumer based possibilities as in the 
developed world? Will the country be kicked out of the European Union or will stay in the exclusive 
club of European countries, but as the poor relative, no one wants to talk to. The Greek debt keeps 
on growing, and the Greek people are made responsible for that debt. When I have made the policies 
derived from the EC in the 1980s my point of focus, it is because I find it interesting, when a people 
get blamed for something that is actual a result of policies not working according to the intension.  
The entering into the European Community in 1981 is what made borrowing a possibility in the first 
place. If Greece hadn’t been treated as a core European country by the international market, it is 
hard to believe that it would have been allowed to borrow sums in the proportion that was the case. 
And my hypothesis is that the policies implemented in the 1980s, which secured large amount of 
transferred money through the Cohesion Funds, together with institutionalized clientelism, created 
a state that needed external funds to function.  
  
Structure of the project 
The project will start with a chapter that focuses on the, for the analysis, important concepts of 
Historical Institutionalism (HI), followed by a chapter about clientelism with reference to Greece. 
Then an overview of the most important events in Greece´s history.  The analyses will be parted in 
three. Firstly, the entering into the European Community will be analyzed as a critical juncture. Then 
the three chosen policies, the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, Single European Act and 
Common Agricultural Policies, will be analyzed through the concept of clientelism, in order to see 
how institutionalized clientelism in Greece has affected the implementation of the policies, and in 
turn, how the policies has affected how clientelism is institutionalized in Greece. Finally, I will analyze 
whether entering the European Community created new path dependencies in Greece. The analyses 
will lead to the discussion, in which the current economic crisis will be explained using the findings 
of the analyses. Finally, a conclusion will wrap it up, and answer the research question.  
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Considerations concerning Historical Institutionalism as theoretical frame 
Historical Institutionalism has been chosen as the approach to analyzing my research question, 
because of its attention to ”real world empirical questions”; its ”historical orientation”, and its 
attention to ”the ways in which institutions structure and shape political behavior and outcomes”. 
(Steinmo, 2008:159) My decision to focus on the 1980s is reasoned in a wondering in, what the 
entering into the European Community affect what is said to be the reason of the current crisis. The 
focus of the theory on path dependency and critical junctures, together with its emphasis on ideas 
as change-creating, fitted well into my own thoughts. Historical Institutionalism seeks to consider 
effects of institutions while holding other variables constant.  
  
Considerations about the chosen empirical data 
The empirical data of the analyses departs from a choice of making the following the empirical frame 
of the project; the historical context of Greece and the main European Regional Policies in the 1980s 
which were the Integrated Mediterranean Programme, the Single European Market and the 
Common Agricultural Policies. Since I am focusing on how these affected clientelism in Greece, and 
how clientelism in Greece affected these, I will primarily be using other academics findings in my 
analyses.  
 
Choice of literature 
The majority of the literature is from different academic journals, which are found through 
Academic Search Premier, Cambridge Journals Online, EBSCOhost, ECLAS, Google Scholar, JSTOR 
and SAGE Journals. Using these academic journals I can be sure that they have been sufficiently fact-
cheeked, and that the authors have some connection with the academic world, in which this paper 
will have to fit. The empirical material that will be used in the analysis is primarily secondary. The 
reason for this is based on the historic character of research question. I found studies that concern 
themselves with the chosen policies, and based on the authors in question; I find reason to rely on 
them.   
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Historical Institutionalism 
The most important concepts of Historical Institutionalism will be outlined in the following chapter, 
in order to get a general idea of the theory, as it will be used in the analysis.   
Individuals, context and rules. These are the important factors in explanations, and you cannot 
beforehand know which factor is the most important. This is what Historical Institutionalists (HI) 
seek to find out, why certain choices was made and why certain outcomes occurred Normally the 
answer is found in a combination of rule following and interest maximizing, on behalf of the actors. 
(Steinmo, 2008:165) HI´s reason to take its departure in real world empirical events, is based on the 
idea that it is through empirical investigation, that institutional structures had profound effects of 
institutional structures in shaping political strategies and ultimately, political outcomes can be 
hedged.(Steinmo, 2008:161) 
HI uses the history as evidence, and Steinmo has three reasons why history matters; first, he argues 
that political events happen within a historical context, which has direct consequences on political 
decisions or events. Second, actors or agents can learn from experience. Behavior, attitudes and 
strategic choices take place inside particular, social, political, economic and even cultural contexts, 
and shape future actions and decisions of the actors involved. Third, because expectations is 
muddled and shaped by past experiences. To sum it up; history is not a chain of independent events. 
(Steinmo, :168) 
Institutions are defined as ”the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions 
embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy.” (Hall/Taylor, 1996:938) 
Special emphasis is put on the role institutions play on structuring behavior. This is independent of 
whether we mean formal institutions or informal rules and norms; both are important for politics 
because they shape who participates in a given situation and also their strategic behavior, interests 
and decisions. (Steinmo, :159) 
Path dependency is one of the most central concepts in HI, which rejects the hypothesis, that the 
same”operational forces, will generate the same results everywhere”, in favor of the view that 
the ”effect of such forces will be mediated by the contextual features of a given situation often 
inherited from the past”. This is because institutions are seen as relatively persistent features of the 
historical landscape and one of the central factors pushing historical development along a set of self-
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reinforcing paths.” (Hall/Taylor, :941)  
Change is very difficult, and the reasons according to Steinmo are the following. First, that any given 
institution, (whether a formal institution or a norm) is embedded within a larger set of institutions. 
Changing one set of rules can and often does have implications for others. Therefore there will be 
resistance to change from those who have advantages in the broader context. Second, people form 
expectations around a given set of rules/institutions. Because the changing of rules can have long-
term effects that you can’t predict, many would prefer to have the rules they currently have, even if 
these are not necessarily optimal. Resistance is anticipated if you go against the stats quo. Thirdly; 
institutions can be locked in because people invest in learning the rule. Therefore changing the rules 
can have here-and-now cost, so change can be resisted by those who don’t want to bear any cost. 
The last reason says that because institutions affect behavior, over time they can also shape 
preferences. Humans may come to prefer a given setup, because it is what they are used to. 
(Steinmo, :169)  
But change can occur. And the two explanations are critical junctures and ideas. Critical junctures 
are characterized by a situation, in which structural influences on political development are 
significantly relaxed for a short period of time. This opens up for dramatic change, and  
Capoccia/Kelemen emphasizes the lasting impact of choices made during those critical junctures in 
history, because ”these institutions close off alternative options and lead to the establishment of 
institutions that generate self-reinforcing path-dependent processes.” (Capoccia/Kelemen, 
2007:341) But the logic of change as consequence of an external shock is also being criticized within 
HI, because it gives human beings no agency, making change purely a product of fate. (Stenmo, :169) 
According to Perter Hall, ideas, once embedded, has framing effects and consequently become 
something like basic templates upon which other political decisions are made and Mark Blyth argues 
that the concept of interest makes no sense without appreciating how individuals understand their 
interests, which makes ideas the very bottom of politics. (Steinmo, 170) Institutional change then 
becomes a possibility, when powerful actors have the will and ability to change institutions in favor 
of new ideas. (Steinmo, :172) The argument is that institutions, ideas and environment should be 
seen as co-evolutionary processes. History and politics are dynamic processes, that keeps evolving, 
and power relations are explored, instead of seeing actors as prisoners of the institutions they 
inhabit. (Steinmo, :175)   
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Clientelism 
This chapter will outline the concept of clientelism, which will be used in the analysis in relation to 
the political structure of Greece. First, I will distinguish clientelism from patronage and corruption. 
Then describe the two traditional approaches towards understanding clientelism, the cultural and 
the developmentalist, and put them in opposition to clientelism as a political strategy.   Thirdly, the 
importance of when and how party´s was founded relative to the bureaucracy in a state, as well as 
what this means for the patronage, as demand/supply driven will be explored. Lastly, I will explain 
the development from the so-called traditional clientelism to party-clientelism/bureaucratic 
clientelism.  
Clientelism and patronage are often used interchangeable, and to a large extent the two concepts 
covers the same thing. Piatonni (2011) makes a distinction though, so let us take her first. Patronage 
is used to denote the public resources – jobs, goods and public decision – that constitute the object 
of exchange between patrons and clients, whereas clientelism is when all decision making becomes 
a token of exchange. (Piatonni: 2011:6)  
Papas (2013) describes patronage as the link between and citizens, where the patron-client ties are 
based on ”direct material inducements targeted to individuals and small groups of citizens whom 
politicians know to be highly responsive to such side-payments and willing to surrender their vote for 
the right price.” The two features of patronage are, first, the distribution of state-related benefits (or 
political rents) to specifically targeted groups and second the material character of such 
inducements. (Papas, 2013:37) Kargagiannis/Kondeas uses the term ´political patronage´ to 
describe ”increases in public sector employment, regulations that limit competition, and the 
imposition of levies on transactions for the benefit of organized groups that are not part of the 
transaction.”  The client groups receive benefits in the name of ´social justice´, ´national necessity´ 
or ´acquired rights´. (Kargagiannis/Kondeas 2012:22)  
Corruption is “the exchange of money (or monetizable goods) for decisions on the part of career or 
elected officials that favor economically particular individuals or groups.”(Piatonni, 2011:7) 
Dimitri (2006) understands clientelism as a ”particular mode of social and especially political 
organization, whose typical structural element and characteristic  building block is the patron-client 
dyad” (Dimitri, 2006:201). Bika´s (2011) clientelism refers to ”links through which the village broker 
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or single villager is linked vertically to the wider society as ´gatekeepers´ or ´individualized clients´ 
respectively.” (Bika, 2011:348) I wanted to show the distinction between the three concepts shortly 
before diving into clientelism.  
This part will look at the two traditional approaches to clientelism as opposed clientelism 
understood as a political strategy. The cultural approach in which clientelism and patronage are 
understood as a cultural phenomenon. (Piattoni, 2011:1) In the case of Greece, that would convert 
to explain clientelism as a consequence of the ´oriental values´ from its Ottoman past or to the 
´patrimonial structure´ of the Byzantine state. (Papakostas, 2011:34) The developmentalist 
approach blames clientelism on the incomplete development of a given political system. That lasting 
marks were impressed early on onto the system of political representation of the country, which still 
affects the way which interests are represented. (Piattoni, 2011:1) An example of this in relation to 
Greece, is using its very early political representation, with voting right to all male citizens shortly 
after the end of the Ottoman Occupation, established the political parties as mediators between 
social interests and state authorities. (Papakostas, 2011:43) The two approaches have in common 
that clientelism, and patronage, are structural features of given politics, but Piattoni (2011) 
challenges that. She has a strategic approach that starts from the assumption, that ”clientelism and 
patronage are strategies for the acquisition, maintenance, and aggrandizement of political power, 
on the part of the patrons, and strategies for the protection and promotion of their interests, on part 
of the clients”. She states that, as ”political strategies, clientelism and patronage have the capacity 
to adapt to the existing circumstances as well as to alter them” (Piattoni, 2011:2). 
The historical context in which parties are formed has a big influence on their use of clientelism and 
patronage. If the parties had mobilized a broad electorate support before bureaucratic autonomy 
was established, they had the option of using the resources of the state in clientelist exchanges. 
Parties founded after a bureaucratic had been created, or which developed outside the political 
system, did not have the same options in their formative years. They were then bound to become 
ideological parties. (Papakostas, 2011,50) It also has importance, how the parties are formed. 
´Externally mobilized parties´, representing politically excluded groups, or ´Internally mobilized 
parties´ founded by elites who occupy positions within the prevailing regime. They tend to be 
patronage oriented because of the different structure of opportunities they were faced with upon 
their foundation. If patronage was an option, then party leaders would also in the future use benefits 
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to attract voters, and groups will support the party in exchange for patronage. The factor that 
decides whether patronage was an option at the founding of political parties depend on whether or 
not ”the bureaucracy was already entrenched behind a ”charter of bureaucratic autonomy” 
(Piattoni, 2011:19) In the case of Greece, the delayed expansion of the state left considerable space 
for political parties to develop strong ties with the society and mediate the relationship to the distant 
state. (Papakostas, 2011,50)  
  
Clientelism is not a static relationship between patron and client. It developed together with the 
surroundings. Traditional clientelism refers to interpersonal patron-client relations, where its typical 
structural element and characteristic building block is the patron-client, which is two individuals, or 
at most the nuclear family that they represent. And out of those many blocks, networks and 
pyramids are constructed with individual politicians at the top. (Mavrogordatos, 1997) Collective 
clientelism is when an entire village or area receives preferential treatment, from a collective patron, 
which could be a political party, if its relationship with voters involves individualized inducements, 
and, in this sense, resembles a patron-client relationship. Bureaucratic clientelism is different with 
traditional clientelism, because the party machine is fundamentally impersonal and its 
organizational core is a group, not an individual. This has a consequence that the political loyalty and 
identification of voters benefits the party, and not the individual politicians. (Marvogordatos, 
1997:3) 
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Historical overview of Greece 
Greece is different from other countries, in the respect, that the ancient Greece has a great 
influence in how Europeans imagine Greece, without having anything in common with modern 
Greece, besides the fact that it is the same geographical area. The idea of ancient Greece became 
important in after Greece´s Independence from the Ottoman Occupation in 1822, which had lasted 
almost 300 years (1458-1822) with the Byzantine Empire before that. The ancient past became the 
cornerstone in which Greece re-invented itself in 1822, with ´hellencity´ as a building block, and in 
fact re-inventing something that never existed, in the creation of Modern Greece. According to 
Malokos (2013) the Western Enlightenment fantasied that the measure of all things were Greece, 
created a circle in which the European fantasy of classical Greece led to a self-fantasizing of modern 
Greece, seeing ”the Europeans as debtors who were going to repay their debt to the ancients, by 
supporting the claims of the modern Greeks for independence”. (Malokos, 2013:3) Fouskas (2012) 
call the modern Greek state ”an artificial construction of British and French imperialism in order to 
block Russian influence in the Mediterranean”,  making the creation of the modern Greece itself a 
strategic decision. Fauskas goes so far as calling ”all phases of Greece´s modernization and territorial 
expansion were led and assisted, and even contained – e.g. Greece´s expansion in Cyprus – by the 
west”. (Fouskas, 2012:29)  
However, the current territories of Greece has only existed since 1932 when it lost its territories in 
East Minor, known in Greece as the ´Asia Minor Catastrophe´. It had important consequences. 1,3 
million refugees was added to the population of 5 million people, which resulted in the 
implementation of a land reform to assimilate these refugees into Greece  (Heather, 2001:47). The 
loss of East Minor also signaled the end of a robust formation of domestic industrial capital 
accumulation, a defeat to an ”entire merchant and financial structures of rich Greeks, a network 
then extending across the region from Alexandria, Smyrna, Constantinople and even the Levant”. 
(Fouskas, 2012:29). The bi-partsian consensus of the Greek liberal and conservative establishment 
at the time of the time of the loss of Asia Minor and the following flow of refugees faced this 
challenge by employing a formidable strategy of agrarian reform, compartmentalizing the only 
sector of the economy that could potentially compete internationally. The reform gave every 
impoverished refugee a small plot to till, hoping that the peasant and his family would as a result 
stay away from socialist and communist influence. (Fouskas, 2012:29) 
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World War 2 had huge consequences for Greece. It lost 13% of its population resisting the German 
occupation, and the psychological memories are still strong among Greeks, leading some Greeks to 
say that ”what they didn't take militarily they will take through economics” (Manolopoulos, 2011:63) 
Following the World War 2 came a Civil War (1946-1949) between the communists and the 
conservatives. The role of the communists in the resistance during World War 2 means that their 
image is not as bad as in the Western part of the world, but massive aid from USA as part of the 
Trueman Doctrine helped the conservatives wipe out the communists, who for unknown reasons 
did not receive help from the Sovjet Union (Manolopoulos, 2011:68).  
The period 1950-1967, but also during the military dictatorship 1967-73, was one of miraculous 
growth for the Greek economy, with a massive reconstruction of the Greek economy after World 
War 2. Like in other European countries, the Marshall Plan was, according to Kargagiannis/Kondeas 
(2012), ”instrumental in he rebuilding of Greek cities and the construction of the new infrastructure 
projects”.  (Kargagiannis/Kondeas, 2012:) The popularity of the communists, and with no more 
agricultural land to distribute, meant that the governments during this period had to develop 
another strategy. The strategy was a massively recruiting of civil servants in order to avoid protest. 
It happened at the same time as the country experienced its ´economic miracle´. (Fouskas, 2012:30) 
The country had an external orientated economy, in which shipping and tourism played a dominant 
role. This is also a consequence of the geographical configuration of the country. (Heather, 2001:47) 
The Greek governments devoted themselves principally to expanding agricultural and industrial 
production, controlling prices and inflation, improving state finances, developing natural resources 
and creating basic industries. During this period the Greek economy grew by an average of 7% per 
year and its industrial production grew 10% for several years in the 1960s. The high growth ended 
in 1974 with the collapse of the military junta (Kargagiannis/Kondeas 2012:23). The military regime 
lasted from 1967-1974, and the coup d´état followed indications that the centre-left party of George 
Papandreou, the Centre Union, would not get the majority of the votes and would have to form a 
coalition with the United Democratic Left, suspected of being a cover for the banned Communist 
Party. (Manolopoulos, 2011:69) The year the military junta collapsed was also the year with the 
worst annual contradiction in GDP in its post-war history, minus 5 per cent. The restoration of 
democracy came in 1975 when the newly formed conservative party New Democracy headed by 
Karamanlis won the election. (Kargagiannis/Kondeas, 2012:23) 
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Historical Institutionalism, Clientelism and Greece 
The choice of using Historical Institutionalism and the concept of clientelism, in wanting to analyze 
the importance of the European policies applied in Greece in the 1980s i order to understand the 
current crisis, is based on the following; Clientelism is by a variety of scholars used as essential to 
understand the political structure of Greece.  According to Manopoulos, the very ingrained system 
of nepotism and clientism in Greece originates in part from the early adoption of universal voting 
rights, combined with an unreformed clan-based system, led to a lack of reformation of the class-
system and thereby a lack of growing middle class, as was seen in Northern Europe. (Manopoulos, 
2001:66). Papadoulis says that ”ever since the Greek state was established in 1830, they [clientelism, 
corruption and patronage, red.] played an essential role and became very important politico-
economic mechanisms of mass manipulation in party and voting structures and linkages” 
(Papadoulis, 2001:17). According to Garcia/Karakatsanis the traditional patron-client relations has 
its roots in the agricultural society, and that these ”have been transplanted into the urban centers 
and continue to enjoy high level of popular acceptence today”  (Garcia/Karakatsanis, 2006, 140). 
Mavrogordatos says that clientelism been a central feature of modern Greek politics, even before 
its indepence”. (Mavrogordatos, 1997:1) And 
Maragikis (2001) states that ”the Greek economy from post-WW2 era to the 1980s had been 
characterized by heavy statist interference and guidance facilitated by the existence and operation 
of clientelistic networks” (Maragikis, 2001:4). The above is to show, that there is a broad agreement 
between scholars, that clientelism can be called a characteristic of the Greek political system 
historically. When Greece entered the European Community in 1981, it entered a community 
created by countries without such characteristics. The principles in which the EC is built are therefor 
not equal to the state of affairs in Greece. Historical Institutionalism has a focus on path dependency 
that I believe will be able explain, why the entering into EC maybe didn't go the way it was supposed 
to go, and I will use the entering in 1981 as the critical juncture, that created the possibilities for 
changing old patterns.  
. 
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Analysis 
Introduction 
The first part of the analysis will look at the entrance into the European Community as a critical 
juncture. What follows is how the three chosen policies, which was the consequence of entering the 
European Community had for how clientelism is institutionalized in Greece. I will take the three 
policies, which are; the Integrated Meditteranean Programmes; the Single European Act and the 
Common Agricultural Policies one by one, and look at how clientelism in Greece affected the 
implementation of the policy and in turn how the implementation of the policy affected the 
insitution of clientelism in Greece. This will lead into a discussionary analysis of whether or not, the 
entering into the European Community can be seen to have created new path dependencies in 
Greece. Is clientelism still an institution in Greece, and if so, how did the entering into EC affect it.  
 
Entering the European Community as a critical juncture in Greece 
Greece was admitted as a member of the European Community in 1981, The country applied for 
membership in 1975, following the military dictatorship, after having been an associate member 
since 1961, also known as the ´Athens Agreement´(Ioakimidis, 2009:76). To explain why Greece 
sought membership, I will focus on how it was believed to strengthen democracy and economic 
development. 
Greek reasons for entering the EC 
It was only six years before entering the EC that Greece had its first post-military dictatorship 
democratic election. Democracy in Greece was not a very stable one. A membership was seen by 
Karamanlis and New Democracy as a paramount factor for achieving political stability and for 
consolidating democracy. (Ioakimidis, 2009:76) It was believed that a membership would reinforce 
the political institutions in Greece and safeguard the liberal democracy (Papas, 2013:34). In the 
words of Ioakimidis (2009) ”when referring to Greece one needs always to bear in mind that in 1975 
Greece sought EU accession primarily as a means of consolidating the newly established (1974) 
democratic institutions.” (Ioakimidis, 2009:87) In other words; the recent past of the military 
dictatorship is not to be underestimated. Greece was part of the so-called thirdwawe of democracy 
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and in the Southern Europe ”EU was regarded as the exporter of democratic governance”. 
(Ioakimidis, 2009:87) Becoming officially a part of Europe would at the same time  resolve Greece´s 
uncertainty, imposed by history and geography, about whether it belonged to the East or the West. 
(Papas, 2013) 
However, the wish to strengthen the democratic institutions is only one side of the coin. The world 
economy had changed since before the military dictatorship, and Golden Age of capitalism was over. 
The transition year back to democracy was also the year the economic growth in Greece ended. The 
Greek government had to initiate severe austerity programmes. Greece needed an international 
partner in order to borrow money, and the choice was between the European Community and the 
International Monetary Union (IMF).  Greece has had a long history of dependence to the United 
States, which it wished to change (Papas, 2013). Heather (2001) explains that one of the promises 
of an integrated Europe was greater economic prosperity in an increasingly competitive and 
unstable world economy. This was supposed to happen through the pooling of resources and 
through the strength provided by being part of a larger economic block with the higher levels of 
solidarity and corporation it would involve. (Heather, 2001:8)  
 
Critical junctures 
A critical juncture is a brief phase of institutional flux in which more dramatic change is possible. Its 
one of the components in a dual mode of institutional development that in Historical 
Institutionalism is characterized by relatively long periods of path-dependent institutional stability 
and reproduction. If I want to argue that Greece entering the EC is a critical juncture, then it should 
be because it changes dramatically the development of the institution in Greece which has my focus; 
clientelism. Clientelism in Greece is the self-reinforcing path that defined Greek political culture 
before entering into the EC.  The policies derived from entering EC are seen as external pressures 
trying to change this path. In other words; it is not enough that entering EC brought changes into 
Greece. To be relevant in this analysis, it has to have brought changes in the institutionalized 
clientelism.   
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Critical junctures is defined to be ”choice points when a particular option is adopted among two or 
more alternatives”. If entering the EC is a critical juncture, then it is because it was a choice among 
others. Entering EC became a choice when Greece restored democracy in 1974. According to this 
logic, by entering the European Community, the political elite in Greece decided that Greece was 
going to be a democratic country. I will not make a counterfactual analysis of what could have 
happened in post-military dictatorship Greece, but I will argue, that the possible entry into the 
European Community can have had a positive on the political leaders. Since 1974 Greece has in fact 
been a liberal democracy.  
The period from 1975, when Greece had its first democratic elections, until it entered the European 
Community, is an important phase in the institutional history. During this period of time, Greece 
made some very important institutional changes. In 1980 Greece made its first Regional 
Development Plan, since otherwise there were a danger that it would not qualify for assistance from 
the European Development Fund. According to Heather (2001) Greece´s accession into the union, 
was directly associated with the introduction of the integrated development approach. (Heather, 
2001:306). The fact that Greece did not have any strategies towards how to make economic 
development in the country is an example of the influence from EC.  What will be shown, though, is 
that the institutional framework coming from EC, changed during its implementation in Greece. 
Why this is important in determine entering EC as a critical juncture, is because it is potentially a 
new set of institutions that is potentially incompatible with the existing clientelistic institutions. I 
say incompatible because institutions coming from EC are based on a Weberian idea of bureaucracy, 
whereby it has been taken for granted that a certain form of politics-administration extist. One in 
which civil servants have a esperit de corps, defining a collective identity, typified by features such 
as calculability, efficiency, instrumentality and legal rationality. (Papadoulis, 2006:15)  
In looking at a potential critical juncture, emphasis should be put on lasting impacts of choices made 
during those critical junctures in history, because they close off alternative options. The government 
negotiating Greece´s way into the European Community and the government in power when Greece 
became a member, was not the same. In the national elections in October 1981 PASOK won with 
48% of the votes. Having been established only seven years before, and the first socialist 
government in Greece since 1923. Papandreou, the leader of PASOK had campaigned for a 
withdrawal from both NATO and the European Community. (KILDE) None of that happened. The 
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explanation could be found in the fact, that PASOK found a way to make the EC work in their 
interests. During the election one of the promises from PASOK was to create a more equal 
distribution of income and wealth through what they called ´democratic planning´. This was 
supposed to happen through the creation of a ´National Welfare State´, especially targeted at 
working class people and farmers. (Kargagiannis/Kondeas, 2012:23) A welfare state is a creation of 
the Western Europe, and enjoys especially popularity in Scandinavia. Immergut, who have been 
studying how different welfare states came into being, argue that different outcomes is not 
necessarily the product of different basic goals or aims put forth by particular parties or interest 
groups. Instead interest groups and parties had to pursue different political strategies in different 
countries due to the different political/institutional configurations established by the individual 
constitutions (Steinmo, 2008:160). I argue that with EC came the funds that made the idea of a 
welfare state Greece a possibility. It would not have been possible to even imagine a welfare state, 
if funds were not made available. But the context in which this was being established was embedded 
in Greek political culture, and as I have argued earlier, this context was one in which clientelist 
structures was historically institutionalized. The ´battle of favors´ that was a way of solving the 
conflict between the right and left in Greece. A conflict that had been part of the reality of Greece 
since the civil was 1945-1949; the solution was buying social peace. (Polychronic, :6) 
 
Introducing SEA, IMP and CAP 
The chosen three policies are; Single European Act, Integrated Mediterrenean Programme and 
Common Agricultural Policies. Following is a short introduction of the three policies, together with 
arguments why they can be seen as important components in the European integration process.  
Maragkis describes SEA as ”the crowning achievement of the early integration period”. Politically 
and institutionally because it was the catalyst that enabled the expansion of competences of the EU 
institutions, and economically because SEA lay the foundations for the Single Market in 1992, which 
in turn was the beginning of the EMU. It was the blueprint for the removal of non-tariff barriers and 
other regulatory impediments to the free flow of goods, services, capital and labor through the 
European Community. (Maragakis, :1) The goal of SEA was to ”add new momentum to the process 
of the European construction so as to complete the internal market.”  (web1) It was the first time 
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that income redistribution was explicitly stated in an EC policy, with the aim of reducing disparities 
between regions in the Community being explicitly recognized and structural funds made available. 
(Heather, 2001:23) IMP, on the other hand, is described by Ioakimidis (2009) as ”the most important 
component of the EU´s integration process”  (Ioakimidis, 2009:84) It was established as a response 
to a 1981 memorandum from the newly elected PASOK government, which was dissatisfied with 
the terms of Greece´s accession. It stated that the country´s special problems needed special help. 
In 1985 a programme to last 1986-92 was established in order to help ´the southern regions of the 
present Community – defined as the whole of Greece, parts of southern France and most of 
southern Italy - ´to adjust under the best conditions possible to the new situation created by 
enlargement´ (Web 2). 
The Greek IMP package was drawn up between August 1985 and December 1987. ( Andreou, 
2006:247) Geugiou calls this the pilot scheme reflecting the new and future direction in Community 
regional policy; the integrated development approach. It involved the combined effort of various 
actors and institutions at different levels, decentralizing state structures and establishing regional 
institutions. Guiding principles as subsidiarity, partnership and additionality are introduced in IMP, 
to become embodied in the reform of the Structural Funds, and subsequently become the 
cornerstone of EC Regional Policy. (Geurgiou, 1994:) CAP was considered the ”main policy tool for 
the rural areas in EU” (Bournaris-Manos, 2012:426). It was a way of tackling the agricultural 
problems in Europa, at a time with food shortage.  The main objectives of CAP, as defined in the 
Treaty of Rome, are: to increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical progress; thus to 
ensure a fair standard of living for the agricultural community; to stabilize market; to assure the 
availability of supplies. The main policy instrument before the reforms of 1992 was price support 
(Baltas, 1999:2).  
 
IMP, SEA and CAP – one policy at the time  
What the following will do is to take the three policies one by one. I will focus on different things, 
according to what the specific programme has changed, which could have affected the 
institutionalized clientelism in Greece. For the IMP that will be the administrative level in Greece. 
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For the SEA the introduction of funds derived from EC. Moreover, for the CAP it will the direct 
economic support to individuals.   
My question in mind while analyzing is; did the accession to the EC and the policies to further 
integration make way for new path in Greece replacing the clientelistic habits?  
 
Integrated Mediterranean Policies in Greece 
The Integrated Mediterranean Policies changed the entire administrative structure of Greece. 
Before entering the EC the only administrative level between the national government and the 
approximately 6000 Local Government Authorities, called ´municipalities´ and ´communes´,  who 
had the responsibility of  providing some rudimentary local infrastructure and services ,was 55 
prefectures, headed by centrally appointed prefects. . (Andreou, 2006:243) The first important 
change in the administrative structure was in 1982, when prefecture councils took the place of the 
prefects, with decision-making powers concerning the public programmes and budget. It was part 
of the PASOKs promise of decentralizing the state. The councils was not directly elected but 
consisted of representatives of local government and of professional organizations, agricultural 
cooperatives, labor movement organizations and champers of commerce. Being dominated by the 
governing party, these councils essentially provided a controlled interest group.  
In 1986 it was discovered that Greece was not in a position to implement the IMPs because it lacked 
the decentralized regional structures required by the EC. (Loakimidis, 2009:86) The next change in 
the administrative structure was instantiated directly by the EC, which divided Greece into six areas. 
They were not given any political institutions or even any administrative structures apart from the 
monitoring committees set up to follow the progress of IMPs themselves. But shortly after the 
submission of the first IMP legislation was introduced that defined 13 regions, which later formed 
the basic unit for the Community Support Frameworks. Each region was to be headed by an 
government-appointed regional secretary, assisted by what Andreou (2006) calls  ”a skeleton staff 
of civil servants recruited from the offices of the national structure” (Andreou, 2006:244). In the end 
Greece ended up with four levels of governance; the national government, 13 administrative 
regions, 54 prefectures, and the LGAs which consisted of 900 municipalities and 133 communities 
(Andreo, 2006:345).  
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The IMP can be said to have created an extra level of administration in an already bureaucratized 
state. Greece is traditionally a very educated country, until recently it produced more students than 
economically advanced countries, about 40% of these were students of law, and many of these 
turned to politics. By borrowing blueprints from Western European states, they gave the state an, 
according to Piattoni; ”extremely legal-formalstic character and implemented the widespread idea 
that social and political problems are juridical problems that can be solved by law”, (Piattoni, 
2001:42).  
Any serious decentralization of power did not come underway before it became a response to 
requirements by the EU in order to receive funds. This arguably gave more power to the Greek 
government in the decentralizing process, since it could refer to EC in the process, instead using 
experience gathered at the local level. According to Andreao (2006) all the relevant texts were 
essentially written by the regional policy department of the Ministy of Economy, with the 
fundamental concern of the authors being to achieve the maximum absorption of funds at the 
earliest possible time (Andreo, 2006:247). That the government wanted this amount of control over 
what was essentially a de-centralization process, gives indications that further centralization was 
actually the point. Andreao (2010) furthermore describes the period between 1987-1994 as being 
a period characterized by politically immobility, and that it is possibly to detect signs of regression 
towards traditional state centralism. (Andreou, 2010:245).  
Concluding IMP in Greece 
The IMP did for fill the aim of creating a regional administrative structure in Greece, but the outcome 
was a further centralization of power in favor of the government. This has strengthened the path of 
clientelism, because it fitted with the strategy of using the state to extend the power base of the 
ruling party. The IMP cannot be seen to have created new paths in Greece.  
 
Single European Act in Greece 
The SEA changed the framework for the economy in Greece. In 1985 Greece was in the might of a 
economic crisis, with PASOKs economic policies not working as supposed to. Maragakis states, that 
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the reason for it not working, was role of the interest groups that constituted PASOKs electoral base, 
aka clientelism. These groups continued their rent-seeking activity regardless of the economic crisis, 
and the government was willing to provide so as to maintain power and strengthening its electoral 
base. (Maragakis, 2001:6). With the undertaken austerity measures not likely to work, it needed 
urgent economic infusion in the form of loans. Greece needed someone to show the market 
credibility of its economic commitments, and EC acted as the mediator between Greece and the 
international markets, so as to secure a loan on more favorable terms than would be possible if the 
Greek government acted alone. SEA was the only politically and economically feasible alternative 
for the PASOK government. (Maragakis, 2001:12/13) In other words; it is very likely that short-term 
interests was behind Greece´s reason to join the SEA.    
 
Peter Hall has demonstrated how ideas, once embedded, has framing effects and consequently 
becomes something like basic templates upon which other political decisions are made. (Steinmo, 
2008:169) The idea of catch-up, that convergence will occur semi-automatically provided market-
mechanism are allowed to operate. Countries with lower per capita income and labor productivity 
have greater potential for rapid growth. (Heather, 2001:10) When EC expects, that it can transfer 
funds to make up for loss in competitiveness which an integration into a market with more 
developed economies would result in, then institutional change is a consequence of a change in the 
ideas held by the actors. Greece needed to do something to change its economic situation. 
According to Maragakis (2001) the Greek government opted for European integration when it was 
perceived as reinforcing its internal position, together with being rational with the economic 
constraints it faced  (Maragakis, 2001:16). What was essential, though, was the promised funds that 
would compensate for decriesed level of public expenditure. These funds would enable the 
government to move towards increasing competitiveness and restructuring Greek production so as 
to adapt to the conditions of the single market. As the idea of ´catch-up´ subscribe. But there was 
no indication that the government actually ascribed to the economic ideas that was gaining 
momentum in the rest of Europe. (Maragakis, 2001:16).   
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Money got transfered through these Cohesion Funds. Between 1989-1993 they amounted to 
14,47% of the Greek BNP. (Heather, 2001:314) And this enabled PASOK to have an increase in it 
revenues, despite of a the worsening competitiveness and despite the fact that tax avoidance is 
institutionalized in Greece. Manolopoulos explains that during the Ottoman rule ”it was a point of 
pride to avoid paying taxes”, and he goes on to paraphrase Zhou Enlai; ”it properbly is to early to 
tell what the long-term significance is [from the Ottoman occupation] with regards to payment of 
taxes and tension with Tyrkey” (Manopoloulos, 2010:64). When Greece gained independence, the 
group that took control was the former taxcollacters. That gave a ruling class that saw the state as 
a source of income, and not as a protector of certain rights like property rights, which created 
conditions for clientelism. (Manopoulos, 2010:64) When tax collecting is perceived to have no 
legitimacy, building a ”National Welfare State” in a nation where people see it as a right to receive 
money from the state, the funding will have to come from elsewhere. And with the entering into 
the EC, with a new-elected government critical towards EC, that elsewhere was found, by receiving 
generous EU handouts, and by state-directed distribution, it used these resources to to satisfy its 
own electoral base. (Papas, 2013:35) According to Ioakimidis it was the financial transfers and the 
realization of the negotiating advantages that would come with membership of the EC that 
contributed to the gradual shift of the PASOK government in favor of European integration towards 
an internal market. (Maragakis, 2005:2)  
Concluding SEA in Greece 
The funds that followed the SEA made it possible for the state to enlarge the state expenditure, 
without having to worry about changing structures in Greece. Expectations from the people, that a 
welfare state could be created without them having to change their way of doing things is the 
consequence. And if expectations is first created, in a clientelist structure, changing that is extremely 
difficult, which lead me to conclude, that the SEA did not create new paths in Greece, but 
strengthened the old ones.  
 
Common Agricultural Policies 
The Common Agricultural Policies was according to Bika (2011) uncritically adopted by the Greek 
government, because of the lack of lack of domestic strategic policy planning in rural areas. CAP 
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guaranteed prices and subsidized crops in the already prosperous years of 1981-1989. State 
expenditure related to farming products rose from 13,8% in 1974-1980 to 35% in 1981-1988.  (Bika, 
2011:355) The Directorates of Agriculture, which is the agenture dealing with agriculture in Greece, 
was formed in the early post-war years, and with funds from the Marshall Plan it contributed to the 
restructuring and rehabilitation of Greek agriculture, that was largely destroyed during World War 
2 and the following civil war. It had a role of being technical/educational, which changed during the 
1970s becoming more administrative. Since 1981 the role of the Directorates of Agriculture has 
been to distribute the funds coming from EC to farmers. From being advisers to being strictly 
bureaucrats, in a purely administrative organization in charge of CAP measures´ management and 
implementation at regional and local level, with a cliente consisting of individual farmers rather than 
organizations/groups. (Papadopoulos, 1997:190,191) And important thing to consider, is the role 
agriculture have played in the history of Greece. It consists largely of small farms. The regional 
administrative level was created for the purpose of handing out funds. A lot of individuals in an 
entitlement culture with a lot of bureaucrats who has as their sole purpose to distribute money. 
This combination will at some point develop into a nightmare, which was exactly what happened in 
1990s when support to the farmers was no longer an option, it had to be given. even though the 
state budget was overstretched. (Bika, 2001:355) The path dependency was created at a time when 
it was the policy of the Community to support farmers directly. When that was no longer the case, 
the farmers had grown accustomed to it. According to Schefter clientelism can be seen as supply-
driven, that is, demands are created of what is offered. Agriculture in Greece never really 
industrialized as in Western Europe, because the clientelist structures in the country made it 
possible for the government to use the funds to their own advantage. That makes it safe to say, that 
the purpose of the CAP did not work in the context of Greece, and that the reason for this could be 
found in the existing clientelist structures in the country.  
Concluding CAP in Greece 
CAP changed the patron-client relationship in Greece because it enabled the government to 
establish a direct relationship with the clients. This shifted power from the local patrons to the 
government. However, this is not enough to change the path of clientelism existing in Greece, it 
merely changed the focus of it, with the consequence of further centralizing of power.  
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New clientelist paths? 
The million-dollar question. Did the policies that was implemented as part of the integration into 
the European Community in the 1980s create new path dependencies inside institutionalized 
clientelism. Or did entering the European Community strengthen the existing institutionalism. 
Capoccia is explicit about that change is not a necessarily element of a critical juncture. (Capoccia, 
2007:348). Meaning; the policies derived from EC can be seen as a critical juncture, without it having 
created new path dependencies. I have analyzed how the clientelist structures in Greece affected 
how the policies was implemented, using Historical Institutionalism because it rejects the traditional 
postulate that the same operative forces will generate the same results everywhere. In contrast; 
the contextual features of a given situation often inherited from the past will mediate the effect of 
those forces (Hall/Taylor, 1996, 938). That is paramount. Intentions and results are not the same. 
The above analysis showed that during the 1980s; the decentralizing of the administration 
centralized power in favor of the government; the funds that were supposed to counterpoise the 
loss in the Greek competitiveness ended up being used to enhance the power base of government; 
the direct economical support to the individual farmers changed the patron-client relationship, with 
the national government replacing the local patrons.  
This shows me, that in no doubt did the existing clientelist institution in Greece affected how the 
policies from EU were implemented. In addition, that explanations derived from the historical 
context of Greece can be found. I argue that the policies did not create the intended path 
dependencies. Greece did not end up with a bureaucracy the Weberian way as a consequence of 
the Intergrated Mediterenean Programmes; it did not use the funds from EC to increase Greek 
competitiveness and to restructure the Greek production as a consequence of the Single European 
Act; it did not create a modernized Greek agriculture. But which path dependencies then became 
the result of Greece entering into EC in 1981? That is what this part of the analysis seeks to answer.  
My argument is that institutionalized clientelism changed in the 1980s. And I will argue, that using 
the arguments of Historical Institutionalism, wherein new initiatives are seen as ´adding on´ rather 
than replacing preexisting institutional forms, this makes perfects sense. It is not possible to create 
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a clean slate, in which a new state without clientelism being the ´ way of doing business´ if historically 
this has been the ´way of doing business´ in Greece.  
There is a theoretical consensus among Greek political writers, that post-war Greek clientelism 
gradually became less ´oligarchic´ and more ´party-oriented´ as the capitalist mode of production 
increasingly dominated and orientations, allegiances and resources shifted from the local to the 
national level. (Bika, 2001:351) I will argue, that the in the 1980s, this ´party-oriented´ clientelism 
developed into a ´bureaucratic clientelism´. According to Polychroniou (2011) political leaders have 
taken turn locking voters into long-term relationships, not based on the delivery of public goods and 
just social order, but on promises targeted resource redistribution to party faithful. The political 
leaders have treated the state, not as a an instrument for carrying out just and effective social and 
economic policies,but as a tool for realizing party-based goals, centralist relations, and purely 
personal interests. (Polychroniou, 2011:13). The government needs to preserve and enlarge the 
private clientelistic base, which finance their re-election campaigns. (Papadoulis, 2006:17) With a 
two party system, where both parties can be seen as populist, a ”fun” consequence derives from 
party-clientelism. Inducements were still targeted at specific groups but since society had been 
divided into two irreconcilable parts represented by parties regularly alernating in power, all citizens 
could reasonably expect to gain from patronage once their own party won elections (Papas, 2013).  
One of the thing institutions do, is that they shape peoples expectations. According do Papas (2010), 
almost all Greeks believe that it is natural to have some income which comes from neither not from 
work nor from risking capital. If they don't get it, they fell wronged. (Papas, 2010) This entitlement 
culture can be traced back to communism, and the bureaucratic sector in Greece, can be seen as a 
path dependency from the strategies to combat the popularity of communism. It is the combination 
of an entitlement culture and a government using clientelist practices to gain support, that is the 
context in which the policies from EC was being implemented.   
New structures in the Greek public administration was created in order to deal with the public 
administration system existing in EC, to deal with the policies coming from EC. Political appointees, 
many without any expertise in EU affairs, have largely staffed this administration. Papadoulis (2006) 
states that ”permanent civil servants are transformed into being more observers of national and EU 
policy processes without having direct stake in the outcome of the processes” (Papadoulis, 
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2006:17). It seems like it was the wish to further integration into the EC that was the reason for 
changing the administration in Greece. Meaning that the changes was a consequence of ideas 
coming from EC, and not coming from experiences in Greece. According to Sotiropoulos (2006) it 
seems like the Southern European governments gave up a wholesale reform of state bureaucracy, 
shifting instead to a ”agencification” of the state (Sotiropoulos, 2006:225). 
It is possible to talk about changes in clientelism from above and from below. During the last part 
of the twentieth century, as far as appointments at the top echelons of the bureaucracy is 
concerned, the person-to-person clientelism was replaced by party-led clientelism. The clientelism 
in promotions and transfers of high-ranking civil service posts assumed a more organized form and 
was engineered  by party organizations. (Sotiropoulos. 2006:201) This is not only typical of Greece, 
but of all of Southern Europe.  
The bureaucracy had a social function in Southern Europe of alleviating social pressures from below. 
Groups that could potentially cause problems – like unemployed, unemployable, or professionally 
insecure social categories (including graduates of political science and humanities faculties, high-
school graduates without university education, internal migrants) – would be offered job 
oportunities in the public sector, particular during periods of rising unemployment or just before 
the conduct of general elections. In this sense the public sector functioned as a social absorber. 
(Sotiropoulos. 2006:201) 
Therefor EC policies adopted to Greek political culture, not the other way around. Therefore, only 
marginal changes to the existing path, which mostly can be said to be strengthened. Clientelism 
was embedded in the bureaucracy, which to a large extent was possible because of funds coming 
from outside Greece, either as funds or as loans.  
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Discussion 
The aim of the analysis was to answer the part of the research question concerning the importance 
of the policies coming from the EC in the 1980s. I focused on the institutionalized clientelism in 
Greece, and analyzed how the implementation of the policies was affected by the existing 
clientelistic structures and in turn how the policies affected a change in the clientelistic structures. 
I established that entering into the European Community was a critical juncture in Greece and then 
analyzed how the three chosen policies, that was a direct consequence of the Greek membership 
was affected by the clientelist institution in Greece. In the final part of the analysis I looked at 
whether or not new path dependencies was created, and how this affected the way clientelim in 
Greece was institutionalized.  The discussion will concern itself with why this is relevant in 
understanding the current crisis, taking departure in the question; can the institutionalized 
clientelism that was strengthened through a bureaucracy in Greece in the 1980s, be seen as a 
explanatory factor in understanding the economic situation today?  
The most important conclusion from the analyses is that the path dependencies established in the 
1980s was not one leading away from the clientelistic structures dominating the political culture in 
Greece. It transformed clientelism, to suit with the new situation that Greece found itself in. This is 
the strategic approach of understanding clientelism. When Greece entered into the European 
Community, the clientelistic structures were able to adapt to the new possibilities this as a critical 
juncture opened up to. The IMP gave the government in Greece more control over the regions, since 
they were able centrally to appoint the people in power at the regional level. The SEA gave the 
government access to funds, which it could distribute to its electorate base. The CAP made it 
possible for the government to create direct patron-client ties with people in the large periphery 
areas of Greece.   
What happened in the 1980s, was that a tradition was established to finance public expenditures 
and rents through, firstly direct transfers from EC funds, but secondly also through external loans. 
Greek debt is not a new invention. According to Geurgiou (1994) 65% of Greece´s economic 
resources in 1991 went to the payment of debt and interests. (Geurgiou, 1994:?) according to 
Polychroniou (2011) the government annual expenditure exceeded revenue by an average of over 
8% of GPD in the 1980s. Not surprisingly, this increased the debt in the same period, due to highly 
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deficits accumulated on a yearly basis. (Polychroniou, 2011:7)The path of spending transferred and 
borrowed money was there for established in the 1980s. Moreover, when Greece entered the 
Eurozone in 2001 borrowing money became even easier than before, because of the collective 
responsibility of the entire Eurozone, which in reality meant that Greece was able to borrow money 
at the same interest rate as a country like Germany. In an economic system where debt is seen as 
growth creating, giving unlimited access to borrowing to a country, which has based its power on 
clientelist ties to its voter-base, seems stupid. That joining the Eurozone would make it possible to 
continue the loan-based patron-client relationship between the government and their electorate 
base, can be seen as the reason for Greece to join. Polychoniou (among others) states that Greece 
entered ”through manipulation of the fiscal accounts because of domestic politico-economic elite 
saw a window of opportunity for easy access to additional wealth and because the EU chiefs at the 
time, largely for political and perhaps even ideological reasons, opted to look the other way”. 
Fouskas states similarly that the Greek government in 1999 paid 3 billion to Goldman Sachs to 
manipulate the numbers, and that it was known to the European authorities, Germany inclusive 
(Fouskas, 2013:135). This brings an interest aspect into the discussion of who holds the 
responsibility. Even though it is safe to say, that the clientelistic structures in Greece can shield a 
light in why the economy is so mal-functioning. The rest of Europe has known this. And if they, on 
top of that, knew that the numbers used to get accepted into the Eurozone was not correct. Then it 
is difficult to see what the population of Greece could have done about it. The European Union 
wanted as many member states as possible to the EURO, and Greece went along for the ride. That 
the EU has not learnt any lessons from dealing with Greece since 1981, cannot be blamed on the 
clientelist structures of Greece. On in the view of being Greece, when it was possible in the 1980s 
to fail to live up the intension behind the EC policies, without consequences, then why not again. 
Expectations in the political elite, that it would be a free ride could have been created as a 
consequence, of the fact that it was like that in the 1980s. The European Union has led Greece being 
further integrated through the Maastrict Treaty of 1992.   
Another factor that could counter the clientelistic paths from the 1980s as the explanation of the 
crisis, is the fact that crisis did not emerge in Greece. Even if it showed that the Greek economy was 
not soothed to be part of the monetary union, still makes the crisis a global crisis, and arguably a 
crisis of neoliberalism itself. According to Polychoniou the growth performance of the Greek 
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economy during that decade ”rested upon the twin pillars of heavy state borrowing and EU 
transfers”. (Polychoniou. 2011:8) EU's Council Recommendation of 12 July 2011 states the 
same; ”Over the last decade, Greece´s growth performance was based on unsustainable drivers: 
consumption and residential investment booms were accompanied by high real wage increases and 
rapid credit growth; low real interest rates associated with the adoption of the Euro and financial 
market liberalism fed the boom.” (Council Recommendation, 2011:1) Greece has not been 
encouraged to change paths in the 2000s, because the paths that was already established, worked 
for some reason. Mylonas (2012) states, that “the advent of the Euro in Greece meant the 
acceleration of the country´s transformation process towards a service economy that relied on 
foreign loans to maintain high levels of domestic consumption of imported goods, produced by the 
core Eurozone countries and export-based economies like Germany.”  (Mylonas, 2012:653)  
So how can the policies coming from EC in the 1980s help us understand the crisis, seeing how 
external events also holds a explanatory power. They put Greece on a path that enabled the country 
to get deeper into European integration. They made the state of Greece dependent on external 
funds, because the political elite did not have to find other ways of holding power, that through the 
pre-existing clientelistic structures. They created expectations both in the and in the population, 
about what kind of state Greece was. Greece being treated like a Western European country, it 
started acting like one. Problem was, it was not. And using historical institutionalism made it 
possible to explain, why the different policies would lead to other results than the intended, when 
implemented in Greece. But as the discussion also showed, the institutionalized clientelism is not 
the only explanation. The rest of the Eurozone let Greece in, despite the fact that it was known that 
the economy was not on pair with the rest of Europe, And the European Union as a whole let Greece 
be part despite the fact the country had not been successful in earlier phases of European 
Integration.  
  
 s. 31 
Conclusion  
The ressearch question as stated in the problem field was the following; What is the importance of 
EU's Regional Policies in the 1980s, in order to understand the current economic situation in Greece? 
In order to answer this, I took my theoretical departure in Historical Institutionalism. The reason for 
this was based on the research question. Greece entered the European Community in 1981, and my 
hypothesis was that this marked an important event in the history of Greece, but that this event 
didnt make sense standing alone. Using HI I could conceptualize the entering as a potential critical 
juncture in the history of Greece. I chose three policies derived from the European Community; the 
Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, the Single European Act and the Common Agricultural 
Policies, and I wanted to analyze, how the implementation of these was affected by the clientelistic 
structures in Greece and how the clientelistic structures in turn was affected by the implementation 
of these policies. My focus on clientelism is that it historically has become institutionalized in Greece, 
and that it affects all aspects of social and political life. I wanted to how clientelism could be used as 
factor in understanding the current economic crisis, which above all, is a debt crisis. I discovered that 
the path dependencies created as a consequence of entering the EC took its departure in the 
institutionalized clientelism.  The IMP gave the government in Greece more control over the regions, 
since they were able to centrally appoint the people in power at the regional level. The SEA gave the 
government access to funds that it could distribute to its electorate base. The CAP made it possible 
for the government to create direct patron-client ties with people in the large periphery areas of 
Greece. The conclusion was therefore, that the paths that became a consequence of these policies 
further strengthened the institutionalized clientelism in Greece. That was taken as a departure for 
the discussion, in which the research question was discussed. I looked at the reasons for why the 
paths that became the consequence of EC policies in the 1980 could help one understand the current 
crisis, and for reasons why this was not the case. No clear picture emerged. It was obliviously, that 
the paths derived from the 1980s had som explanatory power. A tradition of external funds to 
finance the public expenditures and rents was created through EU transfers. Debt was also being 
acquired at that time, something that only became more widely used with the entering into the 
Eurozone, with the fact that borrowing money became that much easier. The fact that Greece 
manipulated the numbers to get into the EMU shows how little they understood of the 
consequences of being part of a monetary union, in comparison to the gains they would get right 
 s. 32 
away. The centralizing of power that was established during the 1980s can be seen a reason for that 
even to be possible. I also saw the expectations that was created during the 1980s to the possibility 
of both having a welfare state and not changing old structures, exists because it in fact was possible. 
It was possible for Greece to not implement the policies as was the intention, and still being 
rewarded with further integration into the European Community. I used this to question the 
intention of the EU in wanting Greece to join the Euro, since they knew what the state of affairs was. 
Alternatively, if they did not, it was a choice not to know.  
If further research should be done on this topic, it would be on what this means in relation to the 
huge debt that the Greeks are being asked to pay today. If the internal reasons for the current 
situation, the institutionalized clientelism in Greece, and the external reasons, the global financial 
crisis, and a EU which have given the political elite the tools to obtain the debt makes one conclude, 
that there was no way the Greek people could have influenced this. Then the term ´odious debt´ 
become relevant in the case of Greece.  
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Abstracts 
English 
The economic crisis of 2008 is often taken to be a very special event when it comes to Greece. The 
Greeks are being blamed for their overconsumption and Greece is often described as one of the 
epicenters of the financial crisis. That Greece alone should be able to shake the global economy 
seems to be an exaggeration with the regard to Greece’s relatively small contribution to the 
European economy. 
The explanation for the Greek debt should be sought not only internally, but as a combination 
between the market based global system and the political constitution of Greece; modern Greece is 
born and developed in the EU and this has had a severe impact on the country’s economy and politic. 
The research question leading the search for another explanation is: What is the importance of EU's 
Regional Policies in the 1980s, in order to understand the current economic situation in Greece? 
The regional politics influences and consequences in Greece is explored and analyzed through the 
theory of Historical Institutionalism, focused on institutionalized clientelism since the clientelistic 
structures both historically and today is said to have a major influence on the political culture in 
Greece.  
The analysis centers on how the policies implemented in Greece in the 1980 when entering the EU 
affected, and was affected by, institutionalized clientelism. To close in on an answer to these 
questions the history of Greece and the institutionalized clientelism in Greece, which led to the 
clientelism that played an important part in the political climate after the fall of the military 
dictatorship is explored. Furthermore, the political and economic reasons for Greece wanting to be 
part of the EU and EUs reasons for welcoming Greece is analyzed as a critical juncture for change 
and development of new path dependencies. 
The examples used to analyze this are Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, Single European Act 
and Common Agriculture Policies, all introduced and implemented in the 1980ies. The last part of 
the analysis shows that these politics, that came from the weberian bureaucracy in EU, influenced 
how clientelism was institutionalized in Greece, hence how new path dependencies were created. 
The conclusions argues that the policies of from the EU was customized to the Greek clientelism, 
not the other way around. Hence policies created to a north west European understanding of 
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economics and bureaucracy failed in the Greek context and did not give the expected outcome. The 
immense debt of Greece can then be said to be a product of the regional politics of EU and the 
tradition of clientelism in Greece alike.      
Danish 
Den græske gældskrise, der startede i 2008 fremhæves ofte som en unik begivenhed. Grækerne 
gives skylden for landets overforbrug og Grækenland udpeges som et af den økonomiske krises 
arnesteder. Med tanke på Grækenlands relativt lille bidrag til den samlede europæiske økonomi, er 
det mærkværdigt, at landet skulle kunne ryste den globale økonomi alene.  
Forklaringen på Grækenlands store gældsproblem skal snarere søges i en kombination mellem det 
markedsbaserede globale system og landets egen konstituering. Umiddelbart efter at landet vendte 
tilbage til demokrati i 1974 søgte det om optagelse i det daværende Europæiske Fællesskab (senere 
den Europæiske Union). Betydningen af denne vending mod EF undersøges under 
problemformuleringen: Hvad er vigtigheden af den Europæiske Unions regionale politik i 1980’erne, 
for forståelsen af den nuværende økonomiske situation i Grækenland? 
EU's regionale politikkers indflydelse og følgevirkninger i Grækenland undersøges via Historisk 
Institutionalisme, med særligt fokus på institutionaliseret klientelisme da de klientelistiske 
strukturer både historisk og i dag tillægges stor betydning i den græske politiske kultur.  
Analysen vil fokusere på, hvordan den politik, der indførtes i Grækenland ved indtrædelsen i den 
europæiske union, blev påvirket af og påvirkede den eksisterende klientelisme. For at komme 
nærmere et svar på dette, undersøges den græske institutionaliserede klientisme og landets 
historiske tilblivelse, der ledte frem til at klientelismen spillede en vigtig rolle i det politiske klima 
efter militærdiktaturets fald i 1973. Grækenlands økonomiske og politiske grunde til at træde ind i 
unionen analyseres sammen med EU's grundlag for at byde Grækenland velkommen som en 
’afgørende begivenhed’ (critical juncture) for forandring og udvikling af ’nye stiafhængigheder’. 
Som eksempler på regionale politiker, der indførtes i Grækenland i 1980’erne, bruges Integrated 
Mediterranean Programmes, Single European Act and Common Agricultural Policies. Analysens 
sidste del viser at disse politikere, der kom fra det et weberiansk bureaukrati: EU, påvirkede hvordan 
klientelisme er institutionaliseret i Grækenland, altså hvordan nye ’stiafhængigheder’ skabtes. 
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Konklusionen er, at den Europæiske Unions politik blev tilpasset den græske klientelisme og ikke 
omvendt. Politik, der var designet til en nordvestlig forståelse af økonomi og bureaukrati, slog fejl 
da de indførtes i de lokale græske kontekst og fik ikke det ønskede udkomme. Grækenlands 
nuværende uoverskuelige gæld er lige så vel et resultat af EU's regionale politik, som af græsk 
politiks klientelistiske tradition. 
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